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“Blessed are the peacemakers;  For they shall be called the children of God.” 
        (Matthew, 5) 
 
Introduction 
 
During the last 25 years, researchers studying human reasoning and judgment in 
what has become known as the “heuristics and biases” tradition  have produced an 
impressive body of experimental work which many have seen as having “bleak 
implications” for the rationality of ordinary people (Nisbett and Borgida 1975).  
According to one proponent of this view, when we reason about probability we fall 
victim to “inevitable illusions” (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994).  Other proponents maintain 
that the human mind is prone to “systematic deviations from rationality” (Bazerman & 
Neale 1986) and is “not built to work by the rules of probability” (Gould 1992).  It has 
even been suggested that human beings are “a species that is uniformly probability-blind” 
(Piattelli-Palmarini 1994).  This provocative and pessimistic interpretation of the 
experimental findings has been challenged from many different directions over the years.  
One of the most recent and energetic of these challenges has come from the newly 
emerging field of evolutionary psychology, where it has been argued that it’s singularly 
implausible to claim that our species would have evolved with no “instinct for 
probability” and, hence, be “blind to chance” (Pinker 1997, 351).  Though evolutionary 
psychologists concede that it is possible to design experiments that “trick our probability 
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calculators,” they go on to claim that “when people are given information in a format that 
meshes with the way they naturally think about probability,”(Pinker 1997, 347, 351) the 
inevitable illusions turn out to be, to use Gerd Gigerenzer memorable term, “evitable” 
(Gigerenzer 1998).  Indeed in many cases, evolutionary psychologists claim that the 
illusions simply “disappear” (Gigerenzer 1991).  
 
On the face of it, the dispute between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics 
and biases tradition would appear to be a deep disagreement over the extent of human 
rationality -- a conflict between two sharply divergent assessments of human reasoning.  
This impression is strengthened by the heated exchanges that pepper the academic 
literature and reinforced by steamy  reports of the debate that have appeared in the 
popular press (Bower 1996).  It is our contention, however, that the alleged conflict 
between evolutionary psychologists and advocates of the heuristics and biases program 
has been greatly exaggerated.  The claims made on either side of the dispute can, we 
maintain, be plausibly divided into core claims  and mere rhetorical flourishes.1  And 
once one puts the rhetoric to one side almost all of the apparent disagreement dissolves.  
When one focuses on the core claims that are central to the heuristics and biases tradition 
and best supported by the experimental results, it turns out that these claims are not 
challenged by the evolutionary psychologists.  On the contrary, some of the most 
intriguing avenues of research pursued by evolutionary  psychologists in recent years 
simply make no sense unless they are interpreted as endorsing these central theses of the 
heuristics and biases tradition.  Moreover, the agreement  runs in the opposite direction 
as well.  When we put aside the rhetoric of evolutionary psychologists and attend instead 
to their central claims about reasoning and cognitive architecture, it becomes clear that 
advocates of the heuristics and biases tradition have no reason at all to object to any of 
these claims and, in some cases, they clearly should and do endorse them.  Thus we 
maintain that much of the dispute between evolutionary psychologists and those in the 
heuristics and biases tradition is itself an illusion.  The fireworks generated by each side 
focusing on the rhetorical excesses of the other have distracted attention from what we 
claim is, in fact, an emerging consensus  about the scope and limits of human rationality 
and about the cognitive architecture that supports it.   
 
Our central goal in this paper is to refocus the discussion away from the rhetoric 
of the debate between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition and 
towards this emerging consensus on fundamental points.  To work toward this goal we 
will proceed as follows:  In Section 1 we will briefly outline the two research programs 
and explain what we take to be the core claims and the rhetorical excesses on both sides. 
Then, in Section 2, we will argue that it is implausible to maintain that either research 
                                                 
1 We classify a claim as a core claim in one of the two research traditions if  (i) it is 
central to the research program, (ii) it is not completely implausible to suppose that the 
claim is supported by the empirical evidence offered by advocates of the program, and 
(iii) advocates of the program are prepared to endorse it in their more careful moments.  
Rhetorical flourishes, by contrast, are claims that (i) are not central to the research 
program, (ii) are not supported by the evidence offered, and (iii) are typically not 
endorsed by advocates of the program in question when they are being careful and 
reflective.    
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program rejects the core claims of the other.  Once this is accomplished we think the 
illusion that evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition have a deep 
disagreement about how rational human beings are should disappear.  This is not to say, 
however, that there are no genuine disagreements between these two research programs. 
In the third and final section of this paper, we briefly outline and discuss what we take to 
be some genuine disagreements between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and 
biases tradition.  
 
 
1.   The Apparent Conflict 
 
 In this section we will begin, in 1.1, by offering a few illustrations of the sorts of 
striking experimental findings that have been produced in the heuristics and biases 
tradition.  Next, we will illustrate the sorts of explanations that those in the heuristics and 
biases tradition have offered for those findings.  Finally, we will outline what we take to 
be the core claims of the heuristics and biases program and contrast them with some of 
the more rhetorically flamboyant claims that have been made.  In 1.2 we start with an 
overview of the basic claims of evolutionary psychology and proceed on to a quick 
sketch of some of the experimental findings about probabilistic reasoning that 
evolutionary psychologists have presented. We’ll then explain what we take to be the 
core claims of the evolutionary psychological approach to reasoning and assemble 
another short catalog of rhetorically flamboyant claims  -- this time claims about the 
implications of the evolutionary psychologists’ results.  Against this backdrop we’ll go 
on, in the following section, to argue that, despite all the colorful rhetoric, evolutionary 
psychologists and proponents of the heuristics and biases program don’t really disagree at 
all about the extent to which human beings are rational or about any other claim that is 
central to either program.        
 
 
1.1   The Heuristics and Biases Tradition:  Experiments, Explanations, Core Claims 
and Rhetoric 
 On the familiar Bayesian account, the probability of an hypothesis on a given 
body of evidence depends, in part, on the prior probability of the hypothesis.  However, 
in a series of elegant experiments, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) showed that subjects 
often seriously undervalue the importance of prior probabilities.  One of these 
experiments presented half of the subjects with the following “cover story.” 
 
A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered personality tests to 
30 engineers and 70 lawyers, all successful in their respective fields.  On the basis 
of this information, thumbnail descriptions of the 30 engineers and 70 lawyers 
have been written.  You will find on your forms five descriptions, chosen at 
random from the 100 available descriptions.  For each description, please indicate 
your probability that the person described is an engineer, on a scale from 0 to 100.      
 
The other half of the subjects were presented with the same text, except the “base-rates” 
were reversed.  They were told that the personality tests had been administered to 70 
engineers and 30 lawyers.  Some of the descriptions that were provided were designed to 
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be compatible with the subjects’ stereotypes of engineers, though not with their 
stereotypes of lawyers.  Others were designed to fit the lawyer stereotype, but not the 
engineer stereotype.  And one was intended to be quite neutral, giving subjects no 
information at all that would be of use in making their decision.  Here are two examples, 
the first intended to sound like an engineer, the second intended to sound neutral: 
 
Jack is a 45-year-old man.  He is married and has four children.  He is generally 
conservative, careful and ambitious.  He shows no interest in political and social 
issues and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies which include home 
carpentry, sailing, and mathematical puzzles. 
 
Dick is a 30-year-old man.  He is married with no children.  A man of high ability 
and high motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field.  He is well 
liked by his colleagues.   
 
As expected, subjects in both groups thought that the probability that Jack is an engineer 
is quite high.  Moreover, in what seems to be a clear violation of Bayesian principles, the 
difference in cover stories between the two groups of subjects had almost no effect at all.  
The neglect of base-rate information was even more striking in the case of Dick.  That 
description was constructed to be totally uninformative with regard to Dick’s profession.  
Thus the only useful information that subjects had was the base-rate information 
provided in the cover story. But that information was entirely ignored.  The median 
probability estimate in both groups of subjects was 50%. 
 
 How might we explain these results and the results of many similar experiments 
that have been reported in the psychological literature?  The basic explanatory strategy 
that proponents of the heuristics and biases program have pursued is to posit the 
existence of reasoning heuristics; rules of thumb that we employ when reasoning.  In the 
specific case of the above experiments, the hypothesis that Kahneman and Tversky offer 
is that, in making probabilistic judgments, people often rely on what they call the 
representativeness heuristic.   
 
Given specific evidence (e.g. a personality sketch), the outcomes under 
consideration (e.g. occupations or levels of achievement) can be ordered by the 
degree to which they are representative of that evidence.  The thesis of this paper 
is that people predict by representativeness, that is, they select or order outcomes 
by the degree to which the outcomes represent the essential features of the 
evidence.  In many situations, representative outcomes are indeed more likely 
than others.  However, this is not always the case, because there are factors (e.g. 
prior probabilities of outcomes and the reliability of evidence) which effect the 
likelihood of outcomes but not their representativeness.  Because these factors are 
ignored, intuitive predictions violate statistical rules of prediction in systematic 
and fundamental ways. (Kahneman and Tversky 1973, 48) 
 
 Though many of the reasoning problems explored in the heuristics and biases 
literature have no great practical importance, there are some notable exceptions.  In a 
well known and very disquieting study, Casscells et. al. (1978) presented the following 
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problem to a group of faculty, staff and fourth-year students and Harvard Medical 
School. 
 
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of 
5%, what is the chance that a person found to have a positive result actually has 
the disease, assuming that you know nothing about the person’s symptoms or 
signs?  ____% 
 
Under the most plausible interpretation of the problem, the correct Bayesian answer is 
2%.  But only eighteen percent of the Harvard audience gave an answer close to 2%.  
Forty-five percent of this distinguished group completely ignored the base-rate 
information and said that the answer was 95%. 
 
 What do these results and the many similar results in the heuristics and biases 
literature tell us about the quality of ordinary people’s probabilistic reasoning and about 
the mental mechanisms that underlie that reasoning?  Though we will return to the issue 
in Section 2, let us grant for the time being that some of the answers that subjects provide 
are mistaken  --  that they deviate from appropriate norms of rationality.  Then, since 
studies like those we’ve mentioned are both numerous and readily replicable, it follows 
that: 
 
(1)  People’s intuitive judgments on a large number of problems involving 
probability or uncertainty regularly deviate from appropriate norms of rationality.   
 
This is clearly a core claim of the heuristics and biases program.   As Kahneman and 
Tversky have said, “although errors of judgment are but a method by which some 
cognitive processes are studied, the method has become a significant part of the 
message”(Kahneman and Tversky 1982, 124).  In addition, however, it is clear that 
proponents of the heuristics and biases program also endorse as a core claim a thesis 
about how to explain these deviations from appropriate norms of rationality, namely: 
 
(2)  Many of the instances in which our probabilistic judgments deviate from 
appropriate norms of rationality are to be explained by the fact that, in making 
these judgments, people rely on heuristics like representativeness “which 
sometimes yield reasonable judgments and sometimes lead to severe and 
systematic errors.”  (Kahneman and Tversky 1973, 48).  
 
 Moreover, if we adopt the (standard) assumption that a cognitive mechanism or program 
is normatively appropriate or “correct” only to the extent that it yields normatively 
appropriate judgments, then, given (1) and (2), it is eminently plausible to conclude, 
along with Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, that “people lack the correct programs for 
many important judgmental tasks….”(1976,  174).  
 
 Slovic et al. are not content, however, to stop with this relatively modest 
conclusion.  Instead, they go on to make the much more sweeping claim that  “[w]e have 
not had the opportunity to evolve an intellect capable of dealing conceptually with 
uncertainty” (1976,  174) thus suggesting not merely that we lack the correct programs 
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for many tasks, but that, in dealing with uncertainty, we lack the correct programs for all  
judgmental tasks. In other words, they appear to be suggesting that: 
 
(3) The only cognitive tools that are available to untutored people when dealing 
with problems involving probability or uncertainty are normatively problematic 
heuristics such as representativeness. 
 
This expansive theme echoes passages like the following in which Kahneman and 
Tversky, the founders of the heuristics and biases program, seem to endorse the view that 
people use representativeness and other normatively defective heuristics not just in some 
or many cases but in all cases -- including those cases in which they get the right answer:   
 
In making predictions and judgments under uncertainty, people do not appear to 
follow the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction.  Instead, they 
rely on a limited number of heuristics which sometimes yield reasonable 
judgments and sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors.  (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1973, 48) 
 
In light of passages like this, it is perhaps unsurprising that both friends and foes of the 
heuristics and biases tradition suppose that it is committed to the claim that, as Gerd 
Gigerenzer has put it, “the untutored mind is running on shoddy software, that is, on 
programs that work only with a handful of heuristics.” (1991b, 235)   In another paper 
Gigerenzer suggests that the heuristics and biases tradition “view[s] … people as 
‘cognitive misers’ relying on a few general heuristics due to their limited information-
processing abilities.” (1991a, 109)   After describing one of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
best know experiments, Stephen J. Gould asks:  “Why do we consistently make this 
simple logical error?”  His answer is:  “Tversky and Kahneman argue, correctly I think, 
that our minds are not built (for whatever reason) to work by the rules of 
probability.”(1992,  469)2 
                                                 
2 While Kahneman and Tversky’s rhetoric, and Gould’s, suggests that untutored people 
have nothing but normatively defective heuristics or “shoddy software” with which to 
tackle problems dealing with probability, Piattelli-Palmarini goes on to make the even 
more flamboyant claim that the shoddy software is more likely to get the wrong answer 
than the right one. 
 
We are … blind not only to the extremes of probability but also to 
intermediate probabilities — from which one might well adduce that we 
are blind about probabilities.   
 
I would like to suggest a simple, general, probabilistic law:  Any 
probabilistic intuition by anyone not specifically tutored in probability 
calculus has a greater than 50 percent chance of being wrong. (Piattelli-
Palmarini 131 & 132) 
 
This is not, however, a claim that any other proponents of heuristics and biases have been 
prepared to endorse even in their least careful statements.  Nor is there any reason to 
think that they should since it is utterly implausible to maintain that this thesis is 
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 If proponents of the heuristics and biases program would really have us believe 
(3), then the picture of human reasoning that they paint is bleak indeed!  But should we 
accept this claim as anything more than mere rhetorical flourish?  For several rather 
different reasons, we maintain that the answer is no.  First, although we shall not defend 
this claim in detail here, it is simply not plausible to maintain that (3) is supported by the 
currently available experimental evidence.  At most, what could be plausibly claimed is 
that we have reason to think that, in many instances, human beings use normatively 
defective heuristics.  The further claim that these normatively problematic heuristics are 
the only cognitive tools that untutored folk have available is vastly stronger than anything 
the available evidence will support.  Second, when they are being careful about what they 
say, leading advocates of the heuristics and biases program make it clear that they do not 
endorse (3).  Thus, for example,  Kahneman and Tversky state very clearly that the use of 
normatively problematic heuristics “does not preclude the use of other procedures” and 
they insist that the currently available data does not support (3) but only the “more 
moderate hypothesis that intuitive predictions and probability judgments are highly 
sensitive to representativeness.” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1983, 88)  This, of course, is 
entirely compatible with the suggestion that in many circumstances we use methods other 
than normatively problematic heuristics.  Finally, as will become apparent in the 
remainder of the paper, the heuristics and biases account of human reasoning does not 
presuppose a commitment to (3).   It is not a central element in the heuristics and biases 
research program. 
 
 
1.2  Evolutionary Psychology:  Theory, Data, Core Claims and Rhetoric 
 
Though the interdisciplinary field of evolutionary psychology is too new to have 
developed any precise and widely agreed upon body of doctrine, there are three basic 
theses that are clearly central.  The first is that the mind contains a large number of 
special purpose systems  --  often called “modules” or “mental organs.”   These modules 
are invariably conceived of as a type of computational mechanism: viz. computational 
devices that are specialized or domain specific.  Many evolutionary psychologists also 
urge that modules are both innate and present in all normal members of the species.  
While this characterization of modules raises lots of interesting issues -- issues about 
which we have had a fair amount to say elsewhere (Samuels (forthcoming), Samuels et 
al. (forthcoming)) --  in this paper we propose to put them to one side.  The second 
central thesis of evolutionary psychology is that, contrary to what has been argued by 
Fodor (1983) and others, the modular structure of the mind is not restricted to input 
systems (those responsible for perception and language processing) and output systems 
(those responsible for producing actions).  According to evolutionary psychologists, 
modules also subserve many so-called “central capacities” such as reasoning and belief 
                                                                                                                                                 
supported by the available data.  We will, therefore, treat Piattelli-Palmarini's 
“probabilistic law” as a particularly extreme instance of rhetorical excess and ignore it in 
the remainder of the paper. 
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fixation.3  The third thesis is that mental modules are adaptations -- they were, as Tooby 
and Cosmides have put it, “invented by natural selection during the species’ evolutionary 
history to produce adaptive ends in the species’ natural  environment.” (Tooby and 
Cosmides 1995,  xiii)  Here is a passage in which Tooby and Cosmides offer a 
particularly colorful statement of these central tenets of evolutionary psychology:  
 
[O]ur cognitive architecture resembles a confederation of hundreds or thousands 
of functionally dedicated computers (often called modules) designed to solve 
adaptive problems endemic to our hunter-gatherer ancestors.  Each of these 
devices has its own agenda and imposes its own exotic organization on different 
fragments of the world.  There are specialized systems for grammar induction, for 
face recognition, for dead reckoning, for construing objects and for recognizing 
emotions from the face.  There are mechanisms to detect animacy, eye direction, 
and cheating.  There is a “theory of mind” module .... a variety of social inference   
modules .... and a multitude of other elegant machines.  (Tooby and Cosmides 
1995,  xiv) 
 
 If much of central cognition is indeed subserved by cognitive modules that were 
designed to deal with the adaptive problems posed by the environment in which our 
primate forebears lived, then we should expect that the modules responsible for reasoning 
would do their best job when information is provided in a format similar to the format in 
which information was available in the ancestral environment.  And, as Gigerenzer has 
argued, though there was a great deal of useful probabilistic information available in that 
environment, this information would have been represented “as frequencies of events, 
sequentially encoded as experienced  --  for example, 3 out of 20  as opposed to 15% or p 
= 0.15.” (Gigerenzer 1994, 142)  Cosmides and Tooby make much the same point as 
follows:     
 
Our hominid ancestors were immersed in a rich flow of observable frequencies 
that could be used to improve decision-making, given procedures that could take 
advantage of them.  So if we have adaptations for inductive reasoning, they 
should take frequency information as input. (1996, 15-16) 
 
On the basis of such evolutionary considerations, Gigerenzer, Cosmides and Tooby have 
proposed and defended a psychological hypothesis that they refer to as the Frequentist 
Hypothesis:  “[S]ome of our inductive reasoning mechanisms do embody aspects of a 
calculus of probability, but they are designed to take frequency information as input and 
produce frequencies as output”(Cosmides and Tooby 1996, 3).  
 
 This speculation led Cosmides and Tooby to pursue an intriguing series of 
experiments in which the “Harvard Medical School problem” used by Casscells et al. was 
systematically transformed into a problem in which both the input and the response 
                                                 
3 The conjunction of the first two central theses of evolutionary psychology constitute 
what might be called the Massive Modularity Hypothesis.  For more on this hypothesis, 
see Samuels (forthcoming) and Samuels et al. (forthcoming). 
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required were formulated in terms of frequencies.  Here is one example from their study 
in which frequency information is made particularly salient: 
 
 1 out of every 1000 Americans has disease X.  A test has been developed 
to detect when a person has disease X.  Every time the test is given to a person 
who has the disease, the test comes out positive.  But sometimes the test also 
comes out positive when it is given to a person who is completely healthy.  
Specifically, out of every 1000 people who are perfectly healthy, 50 of them test 
positive for the disease. 
 Imagine that we have assembled a random sample of 1000 Americans.  
They were selected by lottery.  Those who conducted the lottery had no 
information about the health status of any of these people.   
 Given the information above: 
on average, 
How many people who test positive for the disease will actually have the disease?  
_____ out of _____. 
 
In sharp contrast to Casscells et al.’s original experiment in which only eighteen percent 
of subjects gave the correct Bayesian response, the above problem elicited the correct 
Bayesian answer from 76% of Cosmides and Tooby’s subjects.  Nor is this an isolated 
case in which “frequentist versions” of probabilistic reasoning problems elicit high levels 
of performance.  On the contrary, it seems that in many instances, when problems are 
framed in terms of frequencies rather than probabilities, subjects tend to reason in a 
normatively appropriate manner (Kahneman and Tversky 1996;  Tversky and Kahneman 
1983; Gigerenzer 1991, 1996).  Though it remains contentious how precisely to explain 
this fact, the phenomenon itself is now generally accepted by evolutionary psychologists 
and proponents of heuristics and biases alike.  
 
 It is still a matter of some controversy what precisely results of this sort show 
about the nature and extent of human rationality. What is clear, however, is that 
evolutionary psychologists take them to suggest the truth of two claims. First, they 
clearly think the data suggest that: 
 
(4)  There are many reasoning problems involving probability or uncertainty on 
which people’s intuitive judgments do not deviate from appropriate norms of 
rationality. 
 
Specifically, for many problems involving frequencies, we reason in a normatively 
appropriate fashion (Cosmides and Tooby 1996; Gigerenzer 1991, 1996). Moreover, 
evolutionary psychologists clearly think that the above results also provide some support 
for the thesis that: 
 
(5)  Many of the instances in which our probabilistic judgments accord with 
appropriate norms of rationality are to be explained by the fact that, in making 
these judgments, we rely on mental modules that were designed by natural 
selection to do a good job at non-demonstrative reasoning when provided with the 
sort of input that was common in the environment of evolutionary adaptation 
(EEA). 
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So, for example, as we have already seen, evolutionary psychologists maintain that the 
mind contains one or more frequentist modules that have been designed by natural 
selection and tend to produce normatively appropriate judgments when provided with the 
appropriate input.  We take it that (4) and (5) are core claims of the evolutionary 
psychological research on probabilistic reasoning.  
 
 Like their heuristics and biases counterparts, however, evolutionary psychologists 
have also on occasion issued exuberant proclamations that go well beyond the core 
claims of the research program and cannot plausibly be viewed as anything other than 
rhetorical excess.  In particular, evolutionary psychologists sometimes appear to maintain 
that: 
 
(6) Our probabilistic reasoning is subserved by “elegant machines” designed by 
natural selection and any concerns about systematic irrationality are unfounded. 
 
This view is suggested in numerous passages in the evolutionary psychology literature.   
Moreover, these rhetorical flourishes tend to suggest, in our view incorrectly, that 
evolutionary psychology poses a direct challenge to the heuristics and biases tradition. 
Thus, for example, the paper in which Cosmides and Tooby reported their data on the 
Harvard Medical School problem, appeared with the title “Are humans good intuitive 
statisticians after all?  Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment 
under uncertainty.”  Five years earlier, while Cosmides and Tooby’s research was still in 
progress, Gigerenzer reported some of their early findings in a paper with the provocative 
title:  “How to make cognitive illusions disappear:  Beyond ‘heuristics and biases’.”  The 
clear suggestion, in both of these titles, is that the findings they report pose a head-on 
challenge to the pessimism of the heuristics and biases tradition and to its core claim that 
human beings are prone to systematic deviations from appropriate norms of rationality.  
Nor were these suggestions restricted to titles.  In paper after paper, Gigerenzer has said 
things like: “we need not necessarily worry about human rationality” (1998a, 280); 
“more optimism is in order” (1991b, 245);  “Keep distinct meanings of probability 
straight, and much can be done — cognitive illusions disappear.” (ibid); and he has 
maintained that his view “supports intuition as basically rational.” (1991b, 242).   Since 
comments like these are widespread in the literature, it is hardly surprising that many 
observers have concluded that the view of the mind and of human rationality proposed by 
evolutionary psychologists is fundamentally at odds with the view offered by proponents 
of the heuristics and biases program.  
 
2.  Making the Dispute Disappear 
  
 So far we’ve outlined in broad stokes the dispute between evolutionary 
psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition. If we are to believe the rhetoric, then 
it would appear that these two research programs are locked in a deep disagreement over 
the nature and extent of human rationality.  However, in this section we propose to argue 
that the air of apparent conflict between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and 
biases program is, in large part, an illusion engendered by a failure to distinguish the core 
claims of the two research programs from the rhetorical embellishments to which 
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advocates on both sides occasionally succumb.  We’ll argue that once one puts the 
rhetoric aside and tries to formulate the dispute in more precise terms, it becomes clear 
that there is much less disagreement here than meets the eye.  To defend this surprising 
contention, we need to start by drawing some distinctions.  In particular, we need to 
distinguish between  (i) a variety of proposals about what precisely is being assessed -- 
what the objects of epistemic evaluation are -- in the psychological literature on 
rationality and (ii) a range of proposals about the standards  -- the normative yardsticks -- 
against which epistemic evaluations should be made.  With these distinctions in hand, we 
will then argue that on any plausible understanding of the dispute over the extent of 
human rationality between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases 
tradition, there is, in fact, no genuine disagreement.  Though the rhetoric would suggest 
otherwise, evolutionary psychologists and their heuristics and biases counterparts are in 
substantial agreement over the extent to which human beings are rational.  
 
2.1  The Objects and Standards of Epistemic Evaluation 
 
 In order to make an epistemic evaluation, one must adopt -- perhaps explicitly, 
but more often than not, implicitly -- positions on the following two issues.  First of all, 
one needs to make assumptions about what exactly is being assessed -- what the objects 
of epistemic evaluation are.  In the dispute between evolutionary psychologists and 
advocates of the heuristics and biases tradition, there are at least two kinds of entity that 
might plausibly be construed as the objects of evaluation.  One option is that the 
researchers are aiming to assess the judgments  that subjects make -- for example, the 
answer “95%” in response to the Harvard Medical school problem.  If this is what is 
being evaluated, then it might be that the disagreement between evolutionary psychology 
and the heuristics and biases tradition concerns the extent to which human judgments 
about probability are normatively problematic.  A second option is that psychologists 
studying human reason are aiming to assess the cognitive mechanisms that produce these 
judgments. In that case, the disagreement might concern the extent to which these 
mechanisms are normatively problematic. 
 
 In addition to making assumptions about what is being assessed, the task of 
epistemic evaluation also requires that one adopt, if only implicitly, some normative 
standard  -- some yardstick -- against which the evaluation is to be made.  As we see it, 
there have been four main kinds of normative standard that have been invoked in the 
debate between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition: 
 
(i) What Stein (1996) calls the “Standard Picture” 
(ii) Two accuracy-based normative standards: 
 (a) Accuracy in the actual domain of a cognitive mechanism 
 (b) Accuracy in the proper domain of a cognitive mechanism 
(iii) An optimality-based normative standard. 
 
We will soon elaborate on these epistemic standards in some detail.  For the moment, 
however, we wish merely to point out that when we combine them with the two objects 
of epistemic evaluation mentioned earlier, we can generate a 2x4 array of options (see 
figure 1);  there are eight different kinds of epistemic evaluation that need to be kept 
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distinct.  In the remainder of this section we will argue that, for each of these options, 
there is no genuine disagreement between evolutionary psychologists and psychologists 
in the heuristics and biases tradition. 
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2.2  The Standard Picture 
 
 When evaluating human reasoning, both evolutionary psychologists and 
proponents of the heuristics and biases program typically presuppose what Edward Stein 
has called the “Standard Picture” of rationality: 
 
According to this picture, to be rational is to reason in accordance with principles 
of reasoning that are based on rules of logic, probability theory and so forth.  If 
the standard picture of reasoning is right, principles of reasoning that are based on 
such rules are normative principles of reasoning, namely they are the principles 
we ought to reason in accordance with.   (Stein 1996,  4) 
 
Thus the Standard Picture maintains that the appropriate criteria against which to 
evaluate human reasoning are the rules derived from formal theories such as classical 
logic, probability theory and decision theory.4  So, for example, one might derive 
something like the following principle of reasoning from the conjunction rule of 
probability theory: 
 
Conjunction Principle:  One ought not assign a lower degree of probability to the 
occurrence of event A than one does to the occurrence of A and some (distinct) 
event B (Stein 1996,  6). 
 
Given principles of this kind, one can evaluate the specific judgments issued by human 
subjects and the mechanisms that produce them. To the extent that a person’s judgments 
accord with the principles of the Standard Picture, these judgments are rational and to the 
extent that they violate such principles, the judgments fail to be rational.  Similarly, to the 
extent that a reasoning mechanism produces judgments that accord with the principles of 
the Standard Picture, the mechanism is rational and to the extent that it fails to do so, it is 
not rational.  As Piattelli-Palmarini puts the point: 
 
The universal principles of logic, arithmetic, and probability calculus ....tell us 
what we should  ... think, not what we in fact think....  If our intuition does in fact 
lead us to results incompatible with logic, we conclude that our intuition is at 
fault.  (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994,  158) 
                                                 
4Precisely what it is for a principle of reasoning to be derived from  the rules of logic, 
probability theory and decision theory is far from clear.  For as Goldman and Harman 
have both pointed out, rules of rational inference cannot literally be derived from logic 
and probability theory (Harman, 1986, Ch. 2; Goldman, 1986,  82).  Nor is it clear which 
of the rules of logic, probability theory and decision theory our judgments and reasoning 
mechanisms must accord with in order to count as rational.  Moreover, there are serious 
disagreements about which versions of logic, decision theory and probability theory the 
correct principles of rationality ought to be derived from. (See, for example, Gigerenzer, 
1991a.)  Nonetheless the essential idea is that we use the rules from these formal theories 
as a guide in constructing normative principles which can then be employed in order to 
measure the extent to which human reasoning and judgment is rational.  
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2.2.1 The Standard Picture and the Evaluation of Judgments 
 
 Proponents of the heuristics and biases program often appear to be in the business 
of evaluating the intuitive judgments that subjects make against the yardstick of the 
Standard Picture.  As we noted earlier, Kahneman and Tversky say that “although errors 
of judgment are but a method by which some cognitive processes are studied, the method 
has become a significant part of the message.” (Kahneman and Tversky 1982, 124)  And 
the method-turned-message appears to be that many of our probabilistic judgments 
systematically deviate from the norms of rationality prescribed by the Standard Picture, 
specifically from those norms derived from probability theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1972, 431; Piatelli-Pallmarini 1994, 140).  A recurrent theme in the heuristics and biases 
literature is that many of our intuitive judgments about probabilities deviate from the 
canons of probability theory in such a way that the deviations can be reliably reproduced 
under a wide range of circumstances that are related in their possession of certain key 
characteristics -- e.g. the manner in which information is presented to people or the 
content of the information about which people are asked to reason.  
 
 At first sight, this would appear to be a claim that evolutionary psychologists 
reject.  Thus Gigerenzer asserts that “most so-called errors or cognitive illusions are, 
contrary to the assertions of the literature, in fact not violations of probability theory” 
(Gigerenzer 1991, 86).  But on closer scrutiny, it is hard to see how evolutionary 
psychologists could reject the claim that many of our intuitive judgments systematically 
deviate from norms derived from probability theory.  This is because some of the central 
features of their research program commit them to saying that human judgments do 
systematically deviate from these norms.  In order to make this point we will focus on 
two features of the evolutionary psychological research program:  (i) the empirical thesis 
that formulating probabilistic problems in terms of frequencies improves performance, 
and  (ii) the ameliorative project of improving statistical reasoning by teaching subjects 
to reformulate probabilistic problems in terms of frequencies. 
 
 As we saw in Section 1, evolutionary psychologists maintain that when problems 
are explicitly formulated in terms of frequencies, performance improves dramatically.  
Consider, for example, the experiments on base-rate neglect.  In 1.1 we discussed 
Cascells et al.’s “Harvard Medical School problem” and noted that it appears to show 
that, under certain circumstances, human beings systematically ignore information about 
base-rates when performing diagnostic tasks (Cascells et al. 1978).  For our present 
purposes, the crucial point to notice about the Cascells et al. experiment is that the 
problem was formulated in a nonfrequentist format.  Subjects were asked about the 
probability of single events -- the probability that a specific person has a disease -- and 
they were provided with probabilistic information in percentile and decimal formats.  The 
results were disconcerting:  82% of subjects failed to provide the appropriate bayesian 
answer to the problem.  By contrast, in 1.2 we saw that when presented with variants of 
the Harvard Medical School problem in which frequencies rather than percentages and 
single event probabilities were emphasized, subjects performed far better than they did in 
the original Cascells experiment.  Although a number of different factors affect 
performance, according to Cosmides and Tooby, two predominate: “Asking for the 
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answer as a frequency produces the largest effect, followed closely by presenting the 
problem information as frequencies.” (58)  
 
 One central conclusion that evolutionary psychologists have wanted to draw from 
these experiments is that human probabilistic judgment improves when problems are 
reformulated in terms of frequencies.5  So, for example, Cosmides and Tooby claim that 
“good statistical reasoning reappears, when problems are posed in frequentist terms.” 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1996, 62)  This, however, poses a serious problem for the view 
that evolutionary psychologists reject the heuristics and biases thesis that human beings 
perform poorly in many judgmental tasks involving probabilities.  After all, it’s hard to 
make sense of the claim that probabilistic judgment improves or that good statistical 
reasoning reappears in frequentist tasks unless  performance on non-frequency problems 
was poor, or at any rate less good, in the first place.  Moreover, it is clear that the metric 
that evolutionary psychologists are employing in order to evaluate whether or not 
probabilistic judgment improves is precisely the same as the one adopted by proponents 
of the heuristics and biases program, namely: the standard axioms and theorems of 
probability theory.  It is precisely because judgments on many frequentist tasks accord 
with Bayes’ theorem (and judgments on nonfrequentist tasks do not) that Cosmides and 
Tooby claim that good statistical reasoning reappears when problems are posed in terms 
of frequencies.  The interpretation that evolutionary psychologists impose on their own 
experimental data -- viz. that performance improves in frequentist tasks -- commits them 
to accepting the heuristics and biases thesis that many of our probabilistic judgments 
deviate from appropriate norms of probabilistic reasoning. 
 
 A similar point applies to another central feature of evolutionary psychological 
research on human reasoning -- the ameliorative project of trying to improve human 
probabilistic inference.  In addition to providing empirical hypotheses about the cognitive 
mechanisms responsible for inductive reasoning, evolutionary psychologists have also 
been concerned with trying to improve the quality of probabilistic inference.  This 
practical project has been vigorously pursued by Gigerenzer and his colleagues.  And in a 
series of papers with titles like “How to improve bayesian reasoning without instruction: 
Frequency formats” and “How to Improve Diagnostic Inferences in Physicians” they 
have shown how probabilistic judgment can be improved by teaching subjects to convert 
problems into a frequentist format (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995; Hoffrage, Gigerenzer & 
Ebert in press).  So, for example, Gigerenzer and his colleagues suggest that if physicians 
convert diagnostic problems into a frequentist format, then they are more likely to be 
accurate in their diagnoses.  
 
 This sort of ameliorative project, once again, poses a serious problem for the 
contention that evolutionary psychologists reject the heuristics and biases thesis that 
human beings perform poorly in many judgmental tasks involving probabilities.  For it is 
extremely hard to see how we can make sense of the idea that performance can be 
improved by converting problems into a frequency format unless subjects were 
previously doing something wrong.   If there was nothing wrong, for example, with the 
                                                 
5Indeed evolutionary psychologists take the fact that performance improves in frequentist 
tasks to support the frequentist hypothesis. 
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answers that physicians provided to diagnostic problems that were formulated in 
nonfrequentist terms, then diagnosis couldn’t be improved by formulating the problem in 
a frequentist format.6 This is, we think, an entirely uncontroversial conceptual point.  
According to conventional wisdom “If it ain’t  broken, don’t fix it.”  Our point is rather 
more basic:  If it ain’t broken you can’t fix it.  
 
 It is hard, then, to sustain the view that evolutionary psychologists reject the claim 
that many of our probabilistic judgments deviate from the norms of probability theory.  
What about a disagreement in the other direction?  Do proponents of the heuristics and 
biases tradition deny the evolutionary psychologists’ claim that many of our intuitive 
judgments about probability accord with the principles of probability theory?  This is a 
suggestion that is hard to take seriously in the light of overwhelming textual evidence to 
the contrary.  Kahneman, Tversky and other advocates of the heuristics and biases 
program note repeatedly that normatively problematic heuristics like “representativeness” 
often get the right answer.  Moreover, Kahneman and Tversky maintain (correctly) that 
they were responsible for discovering that formulating many judgmental problems in 
terms of frequencies leads to a dramatic improvement in performance (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1996).  And, as we’ll see later on, they have also attempted to explain this 
phenomenon by providing an analysis of how the “extensional cues” provided by 
frequentist formulations of probabilistic problems, facilitate reasoning.  It is, therefore, 
singularly implausible to maintain that proponents of heuristics and biases deny that there 
are many probabilistic problems in which subjects’ judgments accord with the probability 
calculus.   We conclude that if there is a dispute between evolutionary psychologists and 
proponents of heuristics and biases, it is not located in the first box in Figure 1.  So it is 
time to replace Figure 1 with Figure 2. 
                                                 
6 This also poses a serious problem for Gigerenzer's claim that problems about single 
event probabilities are meaningless and that, as a result, subject’s responses to such 
problems are not violations of the probability calculus.  If problems about single events 
are really meaningless, then subject's answers to such problems couldn't  be wrong by the 
lights of the probability calculus.  In which case, it is extremely hard to see how 
performance on reasoning tasks could improve when problems are reformulated in terms 
of frequencies as opposed to single-events.  Indeed, if, as evolutionary psychologists 
often appear to suggest, the frequentist problems given to experimental subjects are 
supposed to reformulations of single-event problems, then it is hard to see how (accurate) 
reformulations of the original (meaningless) problems could be anything other than 
meaningless.  In short: it is exceedingly hard to see how it could both be the case that (a) 
human reasoning improves when problems are reformulated in terms of frequencies, and 
(b) that nonfrequentist problems are meaningless. 
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2.2.2  The Standard Picture and the Evaluation of Mechanisms 
  
 If there is no substantive disagreement between evolutionary psychologists and 
proponents of the heuristics and biases tradition over whether or not our probabilistic 
judgments accord with the principles of the Standard Picture, then perhaps a 
disagreement exists over whether or not the cognitive mechanisms that subserve 
probabilistic reasoning accord with these principles?  Certainly, much of what has been 
said by participants in the debate suggests such a disagreement.  Thus, for example, 
Cosmides and Tooby explicitly represent their project as a challenge to what they see as 
“the conclusion most common in the literature on judgment under uncertainty -- that our 
inductive reasoning mechanisms do not embody a calculus of probability.” (Cosmides 
and Tooby 1996, 1)  But when one considers the issue more carefully it becomes difficult 
to sustain the view that there is any genuine disagreement here -- or so we shall argue.  
 
 In order to defend this claim, we’ll start by arguing that the positive accounts of 
probabilistic reasoning that evolutionary psychologists and proponents of heuristics and 
biases have developed are not incompatible.  Indeed, rather than being incompatible, the 
views that have emerged from these two research programs about the nature of 
probabilistic reasoning mechanisms are to a surprising degree complementary.  For while 
the heuristics and biases program has been primarily concerned with finding cases where 
subjects do a bad job in their probabilistic reasoning and proposing mechanisms to 
explain these shortcomings, evolutionary psychologists have been more concerned with 
positing mechanisms in order to explain those instances in which our probabilistic 
reasoning is normatively unproblematic.  In short, the two research programs have simply 
focused on different phenomena.  
 
 Evolutionary psychologists have endorsed a range of claims about the 
mechanisms that subserve probabilistic inference in human beings.  One often repeated 
claim is that the human mind contains a “multitude of elegant machines” for inductive 
reasoning: “many different ones, each appropriate to a different kind of decision-making 
problem.” (Cosmides and Tooby 1996, 63)   Moreover, evolutionary psychologists 
contend that at least some of these mechanisms  -- specifically, frequentist mechanisms -- 
are normatively appropriate relative to precisely the same standard that the heuristics and 
biases program endorses, viz. their input-output patterns match what would be required 
by the Bayesian theory of probability. Thus Cosmides and Tooby suggest that  “people 
do have reliably developing mechanisms that allow them to apply the calculus of 
probability.”  (Cosmides and Tooby 1996, 18). 
 
 It is important to stress, however, that these frequentist mechanisms are supposed 
to be format restricted;  they are only able to process information that is presented in the 
appropriate format.  More specifically,  frequentist mechanisms “are designed to accept 
probabilistic information when it is in the form of a frequency, and to produce a 
frequency as their output.”(ibid.)  When probabilistic problems are presented in a non-
frequentist format, however, evolutionary psychologists contend that our judgments will 
deviate from those prescribed by the calculus of probability because the frequentist 
 19 
mechanisms will be unable to process the information.7  In short: according to 
evolutionary psychology, whether or not our probabilistic reasoning mechanisms produce 
judgments that accord with the probability calculus depends crucially on the format in 
which  the information is presented. 
 
 The previous two paragraphs provide a brief description of the main positive  
theses that evolutionary psychologists endorse about probabilistic inference in humans. 
But it is important to stress that this cannot be the entire story.   Nor, for that matter, do 
evolutionary psychologists suggest that it is.  Indeed they insist that we may well need to 
posit a wide range of other inductive mechanisms -- each of which operates according to 
different principles -- in order to explain human reasoning (Cosmides and Tooby 1996, 
63).   One class of phenomena that is clearly in need of explanation are those instances in 
which subjects respond to probabilistic problems in ways that deviate from the norms of 
the probability calculus.  These responses are not random but systematic in character.  
And presumably a complete account of human probabilistic reasoning needs to explain 
the inferential patterns that occur when we deviate from the probability calculus as well 
as those that occur when we get things right.  Though evolutionary psychologists clearly 
accept this point and are prepared to posit additional mechanisms in order to explain the 
results, they have, as yet, provided no detailed theory which accounts for these results.8  
                                                 
7An analogy might help to illuminate the proposal.  Consider a standard electronic 
calculator that is designed to take as inputs mathematical problems that are presented in a 
standard base-10 notation.  We might suppose that such a machine is a well-designed, 
specialized computational device that reliably solves problems that are presented in the 
appropriate format -- i.e. base-10 Arabic notation.  But suppose that we were to use the 
calculator to solve a problem stated in terms of Roman numerals.  Since there simply are 
no buttons for “X” and “L” and “I” there would be no way for the calculator to deal with 
the problem (unless, of course, we first translate it into Arabic notation). 
 
8 One might think that the notion of format restriction provides us with at least the outline 
for an explanation of why we perform poorly on probabilistic problems that are presented 
in non-frequentist formats: viz. frequentist mechanisms will be unable to “handle” these 
problems because they are encoded in the wrong format.  But the fact that the 
normatively unproblematic mechanisms are format restricted only tells us that problems 
with the wrong format won’t  be assigned to (or be handled by) them.  So they must be 
handled by some other component of the mind.  But that’s all the notion of format 
restriction tells us, and that hardly counts as an explanation of why we give the wrong 
answer.  Nor, of course, does it explain why we make the specific sorts of systematic 
errors that have been documented in the psychological literature.  So, for example, it 
clearly does not explain why, for nonfrequentist problems, base-rates tend to be neglected 
as opposed to over-stressed or why human beings tend to exhibit over-confidence as 
opposed to, say, under-confidence.  The point that needs to be stressed here is that it is 
implausible to think that these normatively problematic responses are the product of 
normatively unproblematic, format restricted mechanisms (both because the responses 
are normatively problematic and because they are in the wrong format).  So there must be 
further mechanisms that are normatively problematic.  And that is just what the heuristics 
and biases tradition says. 
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Nevertheless, they require an explanation.  And presumably the explanation will need to 
invoke mechanisms in addition to the frequentist mechanisms discussed above.  
Moreover, these additional mechanisms will not map inputs onto the same outputs that 
the probability calculus would and, hence, they will be normatively problematic by the 
lights of the Standard Picture. 
 
 Is there any reason to think that proponents of the heuristics and biases program 
would or should disagree with any of this?  As far as we can see, the answer is no.  First 
of all, it is important to see that, according to the above picture of our reasoning 
architecture, the total system will yield lots of mistakes, though it will also yield lots of 
correct answers.  And this is entirely consistent with the heuristics and biases account.  
Moreover, proponents of the heuristics and biases program will clearly not want to reject 
the claim that we possess cognitive mechanisms that fail to produce the input-output 
mappings that are sanctioned by the probability calculus.  That there are such 
mechanisms is a central claim of the heuristics and biases approach to human 
probabilistic reasoning.  Indeed, it would appear that the positive views that evolutionary 
psychologists endorse about the nature of our reasoning architecture is consistent with 
the claim that the systems responsible for producing nonbayesian judgments employ the 
sorts of heuristics that Kahneman, Tversky and their followers have invoked in order to 
explain deviations from the probability calculus.  So, for example, it may be the case that 
some of the normatively problematic mechanisms that evolutionary psychologists must 
posit to explain normatively problematic judgments implement the representativeness and 
availability heuristics. 
 
 At this point it might be suggested that proponents of the heuristics and biases 
program reject the existence of mechanisms that operate according to principles of the 
probability calculus.  This could be either because (a) they reject the existence of more 
than one reasoning mechanism or (b) while they accept the existence of more than one 
reasoning mechanism, they deny that any of them operate according to the principles of 
probability.  Let’s consider these options in turn. 
 
 Evolutionary psychologists sometimes appear to suggest that proponents of the 
heuristics and biases program are wedded to the assumptions that there are no domain 
specific or modular mechanisms for reasoning and that all reasoning is subserved by 
general-purpose processes and mechanisms.  So, for example, Cosmides and Tooby 
appear to attribute to the heuristics and biases program “a certain old-fashioned image of 
the mind: that it has the architecture of an early model, limited-resource general-purpose 
computer.” (Cosmides and Tooby 1996, 13)  There is plenty of textual evidence, 
however, that proponents of the heuristics and biases program do not endorse such a 
picture of the mind. So, for example, in a passage that anticipates a central theme in the 
work of evolutionary psychologists, Kahneman and Tversky compare the processes 
involved in the solving of probabilistic problems “with the operation of a flexible 
computer program that incorporates a variety of potentially useful subroutines.”9  
(Kahneman and Tversky 1983,  88)  Elsewhere, they are even more explicit on the matter 
                                                 
9 Compare to Cosmides and Tooby's own suggestion that the human mind “can be 
likened to a computer program with millions of lines of code and hundreds or thousands 
of functionally specialized subroutines”  (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, 39). 
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and claim that “the actual reasoning process is schema-bound or content-bound so that 
different operations or inferential rules are available in different contexts” and that 
“consequently, human reasoning cannot be adequately described in terms of content-
independent formal rules.” (Kahneman and Tversky 1983, 499).  Piattelli-Palmarini is 
still more explicit in his endorsement of a domain-specific conception of human 
reasoning and goes so far as to suggest (rightly or wrongly) that judgmental errors are “a 
demonstration of what modern cognitive science calls the ‘modularity’ of the mind.” 
(Piattelli-Palmarini 1994,  32)  In other words, Piattelli-Palmarini appears to be endorsing 
the claim that we possess modules for reasoning. 
 
 So proponents of the heuristics and biases program do not appear to be adverse to 
the idea that human reasoning is subserved by a variety of domain specific cognitive 
mechanisms.  Do they, perhaps, deny that any of these mechanisms operate according to 
the principles of the probability calculus?  If they did maintain this position, then there 
would be a genuine disagreement between evolutionary psychologists and proponents of 
the heuristics and biases program.  But there is, in fact, no reason  to suppose that they do 
hold such a view.  First of all, nowhere in the heuristics and biases literature have we 
been able to find a single passage in which it is explicitly denied that we possess some 
cognitive mechanisms that operate according to the principles of the probability calculus.  
What we do find, however, are passages that may be interpreted as suggesting that there 
are no such mechanisms.  So, for example, as we noted earlier, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1973) claim that  
 
In making predictions and judgments under uncertainty, people do not appear to 
follow the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction.  Instead, they 
rely on a limited number of heuristics which sometimes yield reasonable 
judgments and sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors.  (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1973, 48)  
 
This and other similar passages in the heuristics and biases literature might be thought to 
have the conversational implicature that we only use normatively problematic heuristics 
in our probabilistic reasoning and hence possess no reasoning mechanisms that operate 
according to the principles of the probability calculus.  
 
 We maintain, however, that there are extremely good reasons to treat such claims 
as instances of rhetorical excess.  First, as we pointed out in 1.1, the claim that we 
possess no normatively unproblematic mechanisms for probabilistic reasoning is clearly 
not supported by the available empirical evidence.  Such a claim is vastly stronger than 
anything the available evidence will support.  And this provides us with some reason to 
treat it as a rhetorical flourish as opposed to a core claim of the heuristics and biases 
research program.  
 
 Second, all the quotations from the heuristics and biases literature that we have 
found which suggest that humans possess no normatively appropriate reasoning 
mechanisms, manifest a tendency that Kahneman and Tversky have, themselves, 
lamented -- the tendency to overstate one’s position by “omitting relevant quantifiers.”  
(Kahneman and Tversky 1996, 589)   Kahneman and Tversky raise this point in response 
to Gigerenzer’s claim that cognitive illusions disappear when problems are formulated in 
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terms of frequencies.  They suggest that “because Gigerenzer must be aware of the 
evidence that judgments of frequency ... are subject to systematic error, a charitable 
interpretation of his position is that he has overstated his case by omitting relevant 
quantifiers.”  (Kahneman and Tversky 1996)  We maintain that much the same may be 
said of the position that Kahneman, Tversky and their followers sometimes appear to 
endorse regarding the normative status of our reasoning mechanisms.  Consider, for 
example, the above quotation from Kahneman and Tversky (1973).  The natural reading 
of this passage is that Kahneman and Tversky are claiming that humans always  “rely on 
a limited number of heuristics” (Kahneman and Tversky 1973, 48).  But notice that the 
relevant quantifier is omitted.  It is left unspecified whether they are claiming that we 
always  use normatively problematic heuristics as opposed to (for example) claiming that 
we typically or often use such heuristics.  And because they must know that the truth of 
the natural reading is vastly underdetermined by the data, it is surely charitable to 
interpret this as an instance of rhetorical excess -- an overstatement of their position that 
results from omitting relevant quantifiers.  Moreover, this point generalizes: In all the 
passages from the heuristics and biases literature that we have found which suggest that 
humans possess no normatively appropriate reasoning mechanisms, relevant quantifiers 
are systematically omitted.  We suggest, therefore, that because proponents of the 
heuristics and biases program are presumably aware that the available evidence fails to 
support the claim that humans possess no normatively unproblematic reasoning 
mechanisms, the charitable interpretation of these quotations is that they overstate the 
position by omitting relevant quantifiers. 
 
 A final point that further supports the conclusion of the previous paragraph is that, 
in their more reflective moments --when quantifiers are not omitted -- advocates of the 
heuristics and biases tradition make it clear that they are not maintaining that we always  
use normatively problematic heuristics and mechanisms in our intuitive reasoning.  
Instead they explicitly claim only that we sometimes or often use such heuristics and 
mechanisms. So, for example, when they are being careful, Kahneman and Tversky claim 
only that “intuitive predictions and judgments are often mediated by a small number of 
distinct mental operations ... [or] ...  judgmental heuristics.” (Kahneman and Tversky 
1996)   But this position is entirely compatible with the evolutionary psychological view 
that we also possess some normatively unproblematic reasoning mechanisms.  In short: 
when proponents of the heuristics and biases tradition express their views carefully and 
fill in the appropriate quantifiers, they end up maintaining a position about the normative 
status of our reasoning mechanisms that does not conflict with the claims of evolutionary 
psychologists.  It is time, then, to replace Figure 2 by Figure 3. 
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2.3  Accuracy-Based Assessments 
 
 Though the Standard Picture is the normative yardstick most commonly invoked 
in the dispute between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases program, it 
is not the only one.  Another kind of normative standard is suggested by Gigerenzer’s 
discussion of “Take the Best” and other members of a class of satisfying algorithms that 
he calls “fast and frugal” procedures (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting, (1991); 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996).  According to Gigerenzer, a central consideration when 
evaluating reasoning is its accuracy (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996, 665).   And because 
fast and frugal algorithms get the correct answer at least as often as other computationally 
more expensive, “rational”10 methods (such as standard statistical linear models) 
Gigerenzer clearly thinks that they are normatively unproblematic.  Indeed he thinks that 
the fact that these simple algorithms are accurate constitutes a refutation of the claim that 
only “rational” algorithms can be accurate and goes some way towards overcoming the 
“opposition between the rational and the psychological and to reunite the two.” 
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996, 666) 
 
 Although the notion of accuracy applies to both judgments and cognitive 
mechanisms, Gigerenzer and other evolutionary psychologists are concerned primarily 
with the accuracy of mechanisms (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Cosmides and Tooby 
1996).  Moreover, it is also clear that once we address the issue of whether or not 
evolutionary psychologists and proponents of the heuristics and biases tradition disagree 
about the accuracy of our cognitive mechanisms, the same considerations apply mutatis 
mutandis  to the putative disagreement over judgments.  For this reason we will focus 
primarily on whether or not there is any genuine disagreement between evolutionary 
psychology and the heuristics and biases program over the accuracy of our cognitive 
mechanisms.  
 
When applied to cognitive mechanisms, Gigerenzer’s accuracy-based criterion for 
epistemic evaluation bears an intimate relationship to the reliabilist tradition in 
epistemology according to which (very roughly) a cognitive mechanism is rational just in 
case it tends to produce true beliefs and avoid producing false ones (Goldman 1986; 
Nozick 1993).11  One frequently observed consequence of reliabilist and accuracy-based 
approaches to the evaluation of cognitive mechanisms is that assessments must be 
relativized to some environment or domain of information (Goldman 1986; Nozick 1993; 
Stich 1990).  A visual system, for example, is not reliable or unreliable simpliciter, but 
only reliable or accurate relative to a (set of) environment(s) or a domain of 
                                                 
10Evolutionary psychologists often use the term ‘rational’ in scare quotes. When doing 
so, it is clear that they intend to refer to judgments, mechanisms or procedures that are 
construed as rational by the lights of the Standard Picture.  
 
11There are also interesting questions about the relationship between the accuracy-based 
criterion and the Standard Picture, but we do not have the space to discuss them here. 
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information.12  Moreover, there is an indefinitely wide range of environments or domains 
to which evaluations might be relativized.  For present purposes, however, let’s focus on 
two that have been suggested by Dan Sperber to be particularly relevant to understanding 
the evolutionary psychological approach to reasoning -- what he calls the actual domain 
and the proper domain for a cognitive mechanism (Sperber 1994).   The actual domain 
for a given reasoning module is “all the information in the organism’s environment that 
may (once processed by perceptual modules, and possibly by other conceptual modules) 
satisfy the module’s input conditions (51-2).   By “input conditions” Sperber means those 
conditions that must be satisfied in order for the module to be able to process a given 
item of information.  So, for example, if a module requires that a problem be stated in a 
particular format, then any information not stated in that format fails to satisfy the 
module’s input conditions.  By contrast, the proper domain for a cognitive mechanism is 
all the information that it is the mechanism’s “biological function to process.” ( 52)  The 
proper domain is the information that the mechanism was designed to process by natural 
selection.  In recent years, many philosophers of biology have come to regard the notion 
of a biological function as a particularly slippery one.13  For current purposes we can rely 
on the following very rough characterization:  The biological functions of a system are 
the activities or effects of the system in virtue of which the system has remained a stable 
feature of an enduring species.  
 
Do evolutionary psychologists and proponents of the heuristics and biases 
tradition disagree about the accuracy of reasoning mechanisms in their proper domains?  
Clearly not.  For while evolutionary psychologists have maintained that cognitive 
mechanisms will tend to perform accurately in their proper domains -- on the kinds of 
information that they are designed to process -- the heuristics and biases tradition has 
been entirely silent on the issue.   Determining the accuracy of cognitive mechanisms in 
the proper domain is simply not the line of work that proponents of heuristics and biases 
are engaged in.  So, there could be no disagreement here.  
 
It is similarly implausible to maintain that evolutionary psychologists and 
advocates of the heuristics and biases tradition disagree over the accuracy of our 
reasoning mechanisms in the actual domain.  Clearly, evolutionary psychologists think 
that some of our reasoning mechanisms are accurate in the actual domain.  But it is 
equally clear that they do not claim that all of them are.  They certainly cite no evidence 
that could support the claim that all of our reasoning mechanisms are accurate in the 
actual domain.   And, what is more important, such a claim would be patently 
incompatible with their ameliorative project.  If all our reasoning mechanisms are 
accurate in the actual domain, then there is little room for systematically improving 
                                                 
12 So, for example, the human visual system may well be accurate relative to the range of 
information that it processes in the environments in which we typically live.  But, as 
Gigerenzer (1998b) notes, our color vision is singularly unreliable in parking lots 
illuminated by mercury vapor lamps.  And in the “world” of the psychophysicist with its 
array of exotic visual stimuli, other components of the visual system can be very 
unreliable indeed. 
 
13  See, for example, Godfrey-Smith (1994), Neander (1991) and Plantinga (1993).   
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human reasoning.  So it must be the case that what evolutionary psychologists want to 
claim is that some but not all of our reasoning mechanisms are accurate in the actual 
domain.  
 
Do proponents of the heuristics and biases tradition reject this claim?  As far as 
we can see, the answer is no.  They clearly think that some of our cognitive mechanisms 
are inaccurate in the actual domain.  This, after all, is a central message of their research 
program.  But they have been largely silent on the issue of whether or not we possess 
other reasoning mechanisms that are accurate in the actual domain.  And this is simply 
because, as we mentioned earlier on, proponents of the heuristics and biases tradition 
have primarily focused on explaining instances of incorrect judgment as opposed to 
explaining instances of successful inference.  Nonetheless, as we saw in 2.2, theorists 
working within the heuristics and biases tradition are not adverse to the idea that we have 
reasoning mechanisms other than the ones which employ normatively problematic 
heuristics and, to the extent that they say anything about these other mechanisms, they 
seem amenable to the idea that they may be accurate.  So, for example, Kahneman and 
Tversky seem entirely comfortable with the idea that mechanisms that employ correct 
rules of probabilistic inference can produce highly accurate judgments in contexts where 
the problem is transparent and “extensional” cues are effective (Kahneman and Tversky 
1983). 
 
The situation is similar when we turn to the issue of whether or not evolutionary 
psychologists and advocates of the heuristics and biases approach disagree over the 
accuracy of our judgments.  Evolutionary psychologists think that we tend to be accurate 
in the proper domain whereas proponents of the heuristics and biases program are simply 
silent on the issue. And both parties appear to think that many but not all of our 
judgments are accurate in the actual domain.  There are, of course, lots of issues of detail 
where the two research programs disagree.  So, for example, Gigerenzer has challenged 
some of the interpretations that advocates of the heuristics and biases program have 
imposed on specific experiments.  We will consider some of these cases in Section 3.  
But we maintain that these disagreements are merely matters of detail and ought not to 
distract from the genuine consensus between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics 
and biases program.  Both programs clearly accept that many of our judgments in the 
actual domain are inaccurate; that we are subject to systematic errors.  This is a central 
claim of the heuristics and biases program and evolutionary psychology is similarly 
committed to this view by virtue of endorsing the ameliorative project.  Moreover, 
neither program insists that all of our judgments are inaccurate.  Both, for example, think 
that our judgments about frequency can be highly accurate.  Again, there is no 
disagreement.   So we can now replace Figure 3 with Figure 4.  
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2.4  Constrained-Optimality Assessments 
 
 A final normative standard that has been invoked by participants in the debate 
between evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition is one that 
applies only to the evaluation of cognitive mechanisms and not to the judgments that 
these mechanisms produce.  The standard in question maintains that a reasoning 
mechanism is normatively unproblematic to the extent that it is optimal given the 
constraints to which it is subject.  This proposal is alluded to by Gigerenzer when he 
suggests that some reasoning mechanisms may be optimal in the way that Herman von 
Helmholtz and Richard Gregory propose that visual processing mechanisms are optimal: 
they are the best systems available  for acquiring an accurate  picture of the world given 
the constraints under which they must operate.  One crucial point to stress is that the best 
system (given the constraints under which it operates) need not be a system that never 
make mistakes.  As Gigerenzer points out, such “systems can be fooled and may break 
down when stable, long-term properties of the environment to which they are adapted 
change.” (Gigerenzer 1998b, 10)   So, for example, Gregory maintains that visual 
“illusions will be a necessary part of all efficiently designed visual machines” -- even the 
best designed visual systems (Gregory, quoted in Gigerenzer 1991, 228).  Similarly, 
Gigerenzer  suggests that, given the constraints under which real cognitive systems must 
operate, “cognitive illusions” or “biases” will be a necessary part of an efficiently 
designed reasoning mechanism.  Thus the Helmholtzian view “allows both for optimal 
cognitive functioning and for systematic illusions” (Gigerenzer 1991, 240).  
 
 Is there any disagreement between evolutionary psychologists and proponents of 
the heuristics and biases program on the issue of whether or not we possess mechanisms 
that are optimally well-designed (given the appropriate constraints) for probabilistic 
reasoning?  Once again, we maintain, the answer is no.  While evolutionary psychologists 
have suggested that we possess mechanisms that are optimal in the relevant sense, 
proponents of the heuristics and biases program need not and do not deny this claim.  To 
see why, it is important to note that when evolutionary psychologists suggest that we 
possess reasoning mechanisms that are optimal given the constraints, they  typically 
appear to have in mind the claim that we possess cognitive mechanisms that are 
optimally well-designed for processing information in their proper domains (and under 
conditions similar to those our evolutionary ancestors would have encountered) and not 
the claim that we possess mechanisms that are optimally well-designed for processing 
information in their actual domains.  Thus, for example, Cosmides and Tooby suggest 
that “our minds come equipped with very sophisticated intuitive competences that are 
well-engineered solutions to the problems humans normally encountered in natural 
environments ... and that ecologically valid input (e.g. frequency formats) may be 
necessary to activate these competences” (Cosmides and Tooby 1996,  9).   But if the 
notion of optimality invoked by evolutionary psychologists is indexed to the proper 
domain, then, as we have already seen in 2.2, proponents of the heuristics and biases 
program do not disagree.  The heuristics and biases program simply is not concerned with 
the performance of cognitive mechanisms in their proper domains.  
 
 Suppose however  that, contrary to appearances, evolutionary psychologists do 
wish to maintain that we possess reasoning mechanisms that are optimal relative to the 
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actual domain.  Even so, they clearly could not maintain that all of our reasoning 
mechanisms are optimal since, once again,  such a view would render their ameliorative 
project impossible.  If all our reasoning mechanisms were the best that they could be, 
then we couldn’t make them better.  Here the (dis)analogy between visual systems and 
reasoning systems is illuminating.  It is plausible to claim that when functioning normally 
our visual systems are optimal in the sense that they simply cannot be improved.  By 
contrast, we can improve our reasoning  -- hence the ameliorative project.  So, the most 
that evolutionary psychologists could be claiming is that some or, perhaps many, of our 
cognitive mechanisms are optimal relative to the actual domain.  But this is not a claim 
that proponents of the heuristics and biases tradition either do or should reject.  To the 
best of our knowledge, proponents of the heuristics and biases program have never 
denied that we possess some reasoning mechanisms that are optimal in this sense.  What 
they do deny is that all of the cognitive mechanisms subserving reasoning are optimal in 
the sense that they always produce judgments that are correct and/or accord with the 
principles of the probability calculus.  This, however, is a very different notion of 
optimality -- a notion of optimality that does not take into consideration the constraints 
under which our reasoning systems must operate.  There is no reason to suppose that the 
heuristics and biases program is committed to denying that we possess cognitive 
mechanisms that are optimal in the actual domain given the constraints under which they 
operate.  For, as we have already seen, the claim that a reasoning system is optimal 
(given the appropriate constraints) is perfectly consistent with the view that it is subject 
to lots of biases and cognitive illusions. Thus proponents of the heuristics and biases 
program need not and do not deny that some or even many of our cognitive mechanisms 
may be optimal in the Helmholtzian sense that Gigerenzer and other evolutionary 
psychologists have in mind.  And if this correct, then we can replace Figure 4 with Figure 
5.  
 30 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     Judgments           Mechanisms 
 
 
“Standard Picture”  No Dispute                  No Dispute 
 
 
 
Accuracy in the               No Dispute                  No Dispute  
 Actual Domain 
 
 
 
Accuracy in the               No Dispute                  No Dispute  
 Proper Domain 
 
 
 
Optimal Given       No Dispute 
  Relevant  
 Constraints 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 31 
3.   Some Real Disagreements  
 
 The main burden of this paper has been to dispel the illusion that there is any 
substantive disagreement between evolutionary psychologists and advocates of the 
heuristics and biases tradition concerning the extent of human rationality.  We do not 
intend to suggest, however, that there is nothing left for evolutionary psychologists and 
proponents of the heuristics and biases program to disagree about.  Clearly there is.  
Indeed there are a number of different disputes that remain.  One of these disputes 
focuses on the issue of how we ought to apply probability theory to specific problems in 
the heuristics and biases literature -- e.g. the Lawyer/Engineer problem and the Harvard 
Medical School problem -- and whether or not probability theory provides a uniquely 
correct answer to these problems.  Though authors in the heuristics and biases tradition 
often appear to assume that there is only one normatively correct answer to these 
problems, Gigerenzer has argued that there are typically a number of equally reasonable 
ways of applying probability theory to the problems and that these different analyses 
result in distinct but equally correct answers (Gigerenzer 1991 & 1994). 
 
Another very real dispute concerns the adequacy of the explanations proposed by 
proponents of the heuristics and biases tradition -- explanations that invoke heuristics, 
such as availability and representativeness, in order to explain cognitive phenomena.  
Evolutionary psychologists have maintained that these “heuristics are too vague to count 
as explanations” and that psychologists working in the heuristics and biases tradition 
have failed to “specify precise and falsifiable process models, to clarify the antecedent 
conditions that elicit various heuristics, and to work out the relationship between 
heuristics.” (Gigerenzer 1996,  593)  Proponents of the heuristics and biases tradition 
have responded by arguing that evolutionary psychologists have “missed the point.” 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1996)  They maintain that representativeness and other 
heuristics “can be assessed experimentally” and that testing the hypothesis that 
probability judgments are mediated by these heuristics “does not require a theoretical 
model.” (ibid.)    
 
On our view, both of these disputes raise deep and interesting questions which we 
plan to address elsewhere.  In the present section we propose to focus on a third very real 
dispute between evolutionary psychologists and proponents of the heuristics and biases 
tradition, one which has often been center stage in the literature.  This is the disagreement 
over what interpretation of probability theory to adopt. 
 
 There has been a long-standing disagreement between proponents of the 
heuristics and biases program and evolutionary psychologists over what we should 
recognize as the correct interpretation of probability theory.  In contrast with 
psychologists in the heuristics and biases tradition, Gigerenzer has urged that probability 
theory ought to be given a frequentist interpretation according to which probabilities are 
construed as relative frequencies of events in one class to events in another.  As 
Gigerenzer points out, according to “this frequentist view, one cannot speak of a 
probability unless a reference class is defined.” (Gigerenzer 1993,  292-293)  So, for 
example, “the relative frequency of an event such as death is only defined with respect to 
a reference class such as ‘all male pub-owners fifty-years old living in Bavaria’.” (ibid.)  
One consequence of this that Gigerenzer is particularly keen to stress is that, according to 
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frequentism, it makes no sense to assign probabilities to single events.  Claims about the 
probability of a single event are literally meaningless:   
 
For a frequentist ... the term “probability”, when it refers to a single event,  has no 
meaning at all for us (Gigerenzer 1991,  88).  
 
Moreover, Gigerenzer maintains that because of this “a strict frequentist” would argue 
that “the laws of probability are about frequencies and not about single events” and, 
hence, that “no judgment about single events can violate probability theory.” (Gigerenzer 
1993, 292-293) 
 
 In stark contrast with Gigerenzer’s frequentism, Kahneman, Tversky and their 
followers insist that probability theory can be meaningfully applied to single events and 
hence that judgments about single events (e.g. Jack being a engineer or, in another well 
known problem, Linda being a bank teller14)  can violate probability theory.   This 
disagreement emerges very clearly in Kahneman and Tversky (1996) where they argue 
that Gigerenzer’s treatment of judgment under uncertainty “appears far too restrictive” 
                                                 
14  This problem was first studied by Tversky and Kahneman (1982) who presented 
subjects with the following task:  
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.  She majored in 
philosophy.  As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.   
 
Please rank the following statements by their probability, using 1 for the 
most probable and 8 for the least probable. 
 
(a)  Linda is a teacher in elementary school. 
(b)  Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes. 
(c)  Linda is active in the feminist movement. 
(d)  Linda is a psychiatric social worker. 
(e)  Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters. 
(f)  Linda is a bank teller. 
(g)  Linda is an insurance sales person. 
(h)  Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.   
 
In a group of naive subjects with no background in probability and statistics, 89% judged 
that statement (h) was more probable than statement (f).  For present purposes, the key 
point to notice is that subjects are asked to make judgments about a single event -- e.g. 
that Linda is a bank teller -- as opposed to a relative frequency.  For this reason, 
Gigerenzer has insisted, contrary to the claims in the heuristics and biases literature, that 
ranking (h) as more probable than (f) “is not a violation of probability theory ...[since]... 
for a frequentist, this problem has nothing to do with probability theory.” (Gigerenzer, 
1991, 91-92) 
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because it “does not apply to events that are unique for the individual and, therefore, 
excludes some of the most important evidential and decision problems in people’s lives.” 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1996,  589)  Instead of adopting frequentism, Kahneman and 
Tversky suggest that some “subjectivist” or “Bayesian” account of probability may be 
preferable. 
 
 This disagreement over the interpretation of probability raises complex and 
important questions in the foundations of statistics and decision theory about the scope 
and limits of our formal treatment of probability.  Moreover, the dispute between 
frequentists and subjectivists has been a central debate in the foundations of probability 
for much of the Twentieth century (von Mises 1957; Savage 1972).  Needless to say, a 
satisfactory treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of the present paper.  But we 
would like to comment briefly on what we take to be the central role that issues about the 
interpretation of probability theory play in the dispute between evolutionary 
psychologists and proponents of the heuristics and biases program. In particular, we will 
argue that Gigerenzer’s use of frequentist considerations in this debate is deeply 
problematic.  
 
 Questions about the interpretation of probability entered the debate between 
evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition primarily because it was 
realized by some theorists -- most notably Gigerenzer -- that these questions bear on the 
issue of whether or not human reasoning violates appropriate norms of rationality.  As we 
have already seen, Gigerenzer argues that if frequentism is true, then statements about the 
probability of single events are meaningless and, hence, that judgments about single 
events cannot violate probability theory (Gigerenzer 1993, 292-293).  Gigerenzer clearly 
thinks that this conclusion can be put to work in order to dismantle part of the evidential 
base for the claim that human judgments and reasoning mechanisms violate appropriate 
norms.  For, as we have seen, participants in the debate between evolutionary psychology 
and the heuristics and biases tradition typically view probability theory as the source of 
appropriate normative constraints on probabilistic reasoning.  And if frequentism is true, 
then no probabilistic judgments about single events will be normatively problematic (by 
this standard) since they will not violate probability theory.  In which case Gigerenzer 
gets to exclude all experimental results involving judgments about single events as 
evidence for the existence of normatively problematic, probabilistic judgments and 
reasoning mechanisms. 
 
 On the face of it, Gigerenzer’s strategy is quite persuasive.  Nevertheless we think 
that it is subject to serious objections.  Frequentism itself is a hotly contested view, but 
even if we grant, for argument’s sake, that frequentism is correct, there are still serious 
grounds for concern.  First, as we observed in footnote 6, there is a serious tension 
between the claim that subjects don’t make errors in reasoning about single events and 
the ameliorative project that evolutionary psychologists are engaged in.  The present 
point is not that frequentism is false but merely that evolutionary psychologists cannot 
comfortably maintain both (a) that we don’t violate appropriate norms of rationality when 
reasoning about the probabilities of single events and (b) that reasoning improves when 
single event problems are converted into a frequentist format. 
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 A second and perhaps more serious problem with Gigerenzer’s use of frequentist 
considerations is that it is very plausible to maintain that even if statements about the 
probabilities of single events really are meaningless and hence do not violate the 
probability calculus, subjects are still guilty of making some sort of error when they deal 
with problems about single events.  For if, as Gigerenzer would have us believe, 
judgments about the probabilities of single events are meaningless, then surely the 
correct answer to a (putative) problem about the probability of a single event is not some 
numerical value or rank ordering, but rather: “Huh?” or “That’s utter nonsense!”  or 
“What on earth are you talking about?”  Consider an analogous case in which you are 
asked to answer a question like: “Is Linda taller than?”  or  “How much taller than is 
Linda?”  Obviously these questions are nonsense because they are incomplete.  In order 
to answer them we must be told what the other relatum of the “taller than” relation is 
supposed to be.  Unless this is done, answering “yes” or “no” or providing a numerical 
value would surely be normatively inappropriate.  Now according to the frequentist, the 
question “What is the probability that Linda is a bank teller?” is nonsense for much the 
same reason that “Is Linda taller than?” is.  So when subjects answer the single event 
probability question by providing a number they are doing something that is clearly 
normatively inappropriate.  The normatively appropriate answer is “Huh?”, not “Less 
than 10 percent”. 
 
 It might be suggested that the answers that subjects provide in experiments 
involving single event probabilities are an artifact of the demand characteristics of the 
experimental context.  Subjects (one might claim) know, if only implicitly, that single 
event probabilities are meaningless.  But because they are presented with forced choice 
problems that require a probabilistic judgment, they end up giving silly answers.  So, one 
might think that the take-home message is “Don't blame the subject for giving a silly 
answer. Blame the experimenter for putting the subject in a silly situation in the first 
place!”  But this proposal is implausible for two reasons.  First, as a matter of fact, 
ordinary people use judgments about single event probabilities in all sorts of 
circumstances outside of the psychologist's laboratory.  So it is implausible to think that 
they view single event probabilities as meaningless.  But, second, even if subjects really 
did think that single event probabilities were meaningless, presumably we should expect 
them to provide more or less random answers and not the sorts of systematic responses 
that are observed in the psychological literature.  Again, consider the comparison with 
the question “Is Linda taller than?”  It would be a truly stunning result if everyone who 
was pressured to respond said “Yes.” 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
 The main aim of this paper has been to dispel an illusion:  the illusion that 
evolutionary psychology and the heuristics and biases tradition are deeply divided in 
their assessments of human reasoning.  We started by outlining the two research 
programs and disentangling their core claims from the rhetorical flourishes that have 
obscured an emerging consensus between the two programs about the scope and limits of 
human rationality and about the cognitive architecture that supports it.  We then showed 
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that, contrary to appearances, there is no substantial disagreement between evolutionary 
psychologists and advocates of the heuristics and biases program over the extent of 
human rationality.  On a number of different readings of what the dispute is supposed to 
be, neither research program denies the core claims of the other and, in many cases, it is 
clear that they should and do endorse each other’s core claims.   Finally, we briefly 
focused on some of the points of disagreement that remain once the illusory dispute has 
disappeared.  Though there are some important issues dividing evolutionary 
psychologists and advocates of the heuristics and biases program, there is also a 
surprising degree of consensus.  Moreover, and this has been our central theme, they do 
not really have any deep disagreement over the extent of human rationality. 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
An earlier version of this paper was discussed at a Workshop on the Evolution of Mind at 
the Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies at the University of Sheffield.  We are 
grateful for the many helpful comments and criticisms that were offered on that occasion.  
Special thanks are due to George Botterill, Richard Byrne, Peter Carruthers, Gerd 
Gigerenzer, Brian Loar, Adam Morton and Michael Segal.  
 
 
 36 
References  
 
Barkow, J., Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (eds.),  (1992).  The Adapted Mind:  
Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.  Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press. 
Baron-Cohen, S.  (1995).  Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bazerman, M. and Neale, M.  (1986).  Heuristics in negotiation.  In H. Arkes & K 
Hammond (eds.), Judgment and Decision Making:  An Interdisciplinary Reader.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bower, B.  (1996).  Rational mind design:  research into the ecology of thought treads on 
contested terrain.  Science News, 150, 24-25.    
Casscells, W., Schoenberger, A. and Grayboys, T. (1978).  Interpretation by physicians 
of clinical laboratory results.  New England Journal of  Medicine, 299, 999-1000. 
Cosmides, L.  (1989).  The logic of social exchange:  Has natural selection shaped how 
humans reason?  Studies with Wason Selection Task.  Cognition, 31, 187-276. 
Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J.  (1992).  Cognitive adaptations for social exchange.  In 
Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992), 163-228. 
Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J.  (1994).  Origins of domain specificity: The evolution of 
functional organization.  In Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994), 85-116. 
Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1996).  Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all?  
Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty.”  
Cognition, 58, 1, 1-73. 
Fodor, J.  (1983).  The Modularity of Mind.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press. 
Gigerenzer, G.  (1991a).  How to make cognitive illusions disappear:  Beyond ‘heuristics 
and biases.’  European Review of Social Psychology, 2, 83-115. 
Gigerenzer, G.  (1991b).  On Cognitive Illusions and Rationality.  Poznan Studies in the 
Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. 21, 225-249. 
Gigerenzer, G.  (1993).  The bounded rationality of probabilistic mental models.  In K. 
Manktelow and D. Over, eds., Rationality: Psychological and Philosophical 
Perspectives.  London: Routledge. 
Gigerenzer, G.  (1994).  Why the distinction between single-event probabilities and 
frequencies is important for psychology (and vice versa).  In G. Wright and P. Ayton, 
eds., Subjective Probability. New York: John Wiley. 
 37 
Gigerenzer, G.  (1996).  On narrow norms and vague heuristics:  A reply to Kahneman 
and Tversky (1996).  Psychological Review, 103, 592-596. 
Gigerenzer, G. (1998a).  The modularity of social intelligence.  In A. Whiten and R. 
Byrne (eds.),  Machiavellian Intelligence II.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gigerenzer, G. (1998b).  Ecological intelligence:  An adaptation for frequencies.  In D. 
Cummins and C. Allen, eds., The Evolution of Mind.  New York: Oxford University 
Press.    
Gigerenzer, G. and Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models 
of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650-669. 
Gigerenzer, G. and Hug, K.  (1992).  Domain-specific reasoning:  Social contracts, 
cheating and perspective change.  Cognition, 43, 127-171. 
Gigerenzer, G., and Hoffrage, U.  (1995).  How to improve Bayesian reasoning without 
instruction: Frequency formats.  Psychological Review, 102, 684-704. 
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., and Kleinbölting, H. (1991).  Probabilistic mental models:  
A Brunswikean theory of confidence.  Psychological Review, 98, 506-528. 
Gigerenzer, G. and Murray, D.  (1987).  Cognition as Intuitive Statistics, Hillsdale, NJ:  
Erlbaum. 
Godfrey-Smith, P.  (1994).  A modern history theory of functions.  Nous, 28, 344-362. 
Goldman, A.  (1986).  Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press.  
Gould, S.  (1992).  Bully for Brontosaurus.  Further Reflections in Natural History.  
London: Penguin Books. 
Harman, G.  (1986).  Change in View.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press.   
Hertwig, R. and Gigerenzer, G.  (1994).  The chain of reasoning in the conjunction task.  
Unpublished manuscript. 
Hirschfeld, L. and Gelman, S. (eds.),  (1994).  Mapping the Mind.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hoffrage, U., Gigerenzer, G. and Ebert, . (In press)  How to improve diagnostic 
inferences in physicians.   
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A.  (1972).  Subjective probability: A judgment of 
representativeness.  Cognitive Psychology, 3, 340-354.  
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A.  (1973).  On the psychology of prediction.  Psychological 
Review, 80, 237-251.  Reprinted in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982).  
 38 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A.  (1996).  On the reality of cognitive illusions:  A reply to 
Gigerenzer’s critique.    Psychological Review, 103, 582-591. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A.  (1982).  Judgment Under Uncertainty:  
Heuristics and Biases.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
Lichtenstein, S., Fischoff, B. and Phillips, L.  (1982).  “Calibration of probabilities:  The 
state of the art to 1980.  In Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), 306-334. 
Mises, R. v.  (1957)  Probability, Statistics and Truth.  London: Allen and Unwin. 
Neander, K.  (1991).  The teleological notion of ‘function’.  Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 59, 454-468. 
Nisbett, R. and Borgida, E.  (1975).  Attribution and the social psychology of prediction.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 932-943. 
Nisbett, R. and Ross, L.  (1980).  Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of 
Social Judgment.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ:  Prentice-Hall. 
Nisbett, R., Fong, G, Lehman, D. and Cheng, P.  (1987).  Teaching reasoning.  Science, 
238, 625-631. 
Nozick, R.  (1993).  The Nature of Rationality.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Piattelli-Palmarini, M.  (1994).  Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule Our 
Minds.  New York: John Wiley & Sons.   
Pinker, S.  (1994).  The Language Instinct.  New York:  William Morrow and Co. 
Pinker, S.  (1997).  How the Mind Works.  New York:  W. W. Norton. 
Plantinga, A.  (1993).  Warrant and Proper Function.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press.   
Samuels, R.  (forthcoming).  Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity 
hypothesis.  To appear in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.   
Samuels, R.,  Stich, S. and Tremoulet, P.  (forthcoming).  Rethinking rationality:  From 
bleak implications to Darwinian modules.  To appear in E. LePore & Z. Pylyshyn (eds.) 
Rutgers University Invitation to Cognitive Science.  Oxford:  Basil Blackwell.  
Savage, L. J.  (1972).  The Foundations of Statistics.  London: J. Wiley. 
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., and Lichtenstein, S.  (1976).  Cognitive processes and societal 
risk taking.  In J. S. Carol and J. W. Payne, eds., Cognition and Social Behavior.  
Hillsdale, NJ:  Erlbaum.  
 39 
Sperber, D.  (1994).  The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations.  
In Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994), 39-67. 
Stein, E.  (1996).  Without Good Reason.  Oxford: Clarendon Press.   
Stich, S.  (1990).  The Fragmentation of Reason.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press. 
Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L.  (1992).  The psychological foundations of culture.  In 
Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992), 19-136.   
Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L.  (1995).  Foreword.  In Baron-Cohen (1995), xi-xviii. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D.  (1983).  Extensional versus intuitive reasoning:  The 
conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.  Psychological Review, 90, 293-315. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982).  Judgments of and by representativeness.  In 
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), 84-98. 
 
 40 
